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A bstrac  t
The informative value given by the announcement of distribution of dividend has
already been investigated. One of the leading studies on this matter is Lintner (1956).
Lintner found a relation between mutation in dividend, profits in the current financial
year and the dividend in the last financial year. This dividend-model is known as the
Lintner-model. When the mutation in the dividend differs from what was to be
expected by this dividend-model, Lintner finds this to have informative value regarding
the amount of profit in the future.
In 197 1 I/B/E/S International started a financial data-file, The Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). This data-file contains the expectations of the analysts
regarding profit. Since 1989 I/B/E/S is collecting this data also for Dutch firms. In this
article an extra variable is added to the Lintner-model, namely the expectations
collected by I/B/E/S mentioned above. The purpose of this article is to find out if there
is still informative value regarding the amount of profit in the future when the mutation
in the dividend differs from what was to be expected by this adjusted Lintner-model.
I. Introduction
Since Jensen & Meckling  (1976) used the agency theory on the relation
between management and stockholder, a lot of research has been done regarding this
matter. The agency theory views the relation between two sides. These two sides will
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be described as the principal and the agent. The agent makes decisions regarding the
interests of the principal. The agent receives compensation from the principal for his
activities. This compensation does not only depend on the effort made by the agent,
but also on the result of his activities. The principal would like to know about the
effort made by the agent, but it is difficult for the principal to get insight on this
information. One assumes there is information-asymmetry between management and
stockholder, This asymmetry will probably not be restricted to the information
concerning the amount of effort made by the agent, but will also be applicable on other
issues like the expected amount of profit in the future.
Because of the different interests and the information-asymmetry between
management and stockholders, problems rise on both sides. The problem management
has is how to convince the outside world that the firm his healthy and has good
expectations for the future. The stockholders also have a problem in obtaining reliable
information concerning the firm. Because management will always say everything is
well, regardless of the real situation. Akerlof (1970) described a similar situation on the
market for used cars. The author shows that on markets with information-asymmetry
between the participants its is important to give guarantees, even if only verbal.
The managers of healthy firms need a way of telling it is going well. To give
their signal more credibility they have to do this in a way that managers of less healthy
firms can’t follow. One way of achieving this, is with dividend. Assuming managers are
reluctant to lowering dividends in the future, a bigger increase in dividends than was to
be expected is quite a strong signal. This shows that management is truly convinced the
high level of dividends can be maintained in the future, which must mean the
expectations for the future are good. Managers whose expectations for the future are
not so good will not increase their dividends in the same way. For them this would
increase the probability of having to decrease the dividends in the future to an
unacceptable level, and this is a situation they would want to avoid. From this it can be
concluded that a bigger increase in dividends than was to be expected, contains
information regarding the future profits of the firm.
In this article it will be investigated if an adjusted Lintner-model gives a better
description of dividend policy in The Netherlands, in comparison with the usual
3Lintner-model. Also, we will try to find extra information regarding the future profit
using the adjusted Lintner-model.
The structure of this article will be as follows. In paragraph 2 there will be given a
description of the data that is used. Also in this paragraph there will be an inquiry to
whether the dividend in The Netherlands has a tendency to stabilise. If so, this would
mean that a deviation from this strategy would contain information. In paragraph 3
there is a description of the Lintner-model. This model has been developed in the
fifties, Since then the stockholders have a lot more information at their disposal, like
the data I/B/E/S is collecting regarding the profit expectations for Dutch firms. This
gives rise to the adjusted Lintner-model presented in paragraph 4. In paragraph 5 the
summary and conclusions of our findings will be presented.
2 . Data and Dividend stabilisation
Data
The data used relates to the period 1986-1996. Two data-files have been used. The
profit expectations have been acquired from the I/B/E/S-data-file. The profit and
dividend data come from the data-file of ING Barings Research and have been adjusted
for stocksplitting and issues of stock. The companies incorporated in this inquiry
appear in both data-files and are mentioned in appendix A.
In The Netherlands one does not only receive cash dividends, but also
stockdividends. Stockdividends are dividends that are paid with stocks and are nothing
more than a mutation of the amount of stocks in the bookkeeping. There is no cash
flow between the company and stockholder like it is the case with cash dividends. In
The Netherlands private persons are charged with incometaxes over the amount of
cashdividend they receive. With stockdividends, provided they come from the fiscal
free agioreserves, there are no such taxes. Hence private persons prefer stockdividends
to cashdividends because of fiscal reasons. This preference is not the case when certain
financial institutions are concerned who do not have to pay income taxes over the
cashdividend received, like for example a pension fund.
4The payment of dividends from agioreserves means that benefits  from the fiscal
advantage it provides are ‘wasted’ on certain financial institutions, like pension funds,
which did not have to pay income-tax in the first place. That is why in The
Netherlands, stockholders usually have a choice in the type of dividend they receive.
This is called choisedividend and it means the stockholders can chose between cash
and stockdividend. In general the value of the cashdividend from which one can chose
is a bit higher than that of the stockdividend (tax effects not taking into account). This
has the consequence that pension funds will choose for the cash dividends, while the
private investors who do have to pay incometaxes over the cash dividends will choose
for the stockdividends. Because these effects are not equal for every investor, and to
be independent of the different tax measures, in this study only the position of the
pension funds will be taken into account.
Dividend stabilisation
Miller & Modigliani (1961) claimed that dividend policy is irrelevant to the value of the
organisation. Hence, from the amount of dividend one does not get extra information
concerning the future of the organisation. Miller & Modigliani worked with the
following assumptions:
1. Perfect financial markets.
2 . Rational dealing of the investors.
3.  Complete knowledge.
But, for real financial markets these assumptions do not hold. There is information-
asymmetry between management and stockholders, which is contradictory to
assumption (1). Also if the claims made by Miller & Modigliani were true, there would
be no apparent reason for the amount of dividend relative to profit to be constant, This
is because dividend would be irrelevant in the decision-making of management.
In Dorsman (1988) a variable is mentioned named stabilisation factor. This
variable is defined as follows:
When there is a positive profit in year t-l and year t:
DSi,t  = Dri,t  / Wr;,t (1)
with,
D&t = The stabilisation factor of fimd  i for year t.
Dri,t = The relative mutation in dividend of fund i from year t-l to year t.
Wri,t = The relative mutation in profit of fund i from year t-l to year t.
Table 1 states the mean and standard deviation of the stabilisation factors in
different years for the organisations in our data set who meet with the restriction that
profit has to be positive in year t-l and year t. Over the entire period of 1986-1996 the
mean of the stabilisation factors for the companies included in the calculations is
80.6%. This means that, on average, the relative increase in dividends is 80.6% of the
relative increase in profit. The mean stabilisation factor varies each year. It reaches its
maximum and minimum in the two consecutive years 1987 and 1988. In October 1987
there was a crash of the stock market. It is possible that the companies have chosen for
an extra increase in the dividend over 1987, that was paid in May 1988, to show that
they were fully recovered from the crash of the stock market, To compensate for this
increase, the next year the increase in dividend staid behind the increase in profit. From
then on the development in the payment of dividends should continue in the old
pattern.
6Table I: Mean and standard deviation of the stabilisation factor together with the
number of observations that were used for the calculations. Source.. Data-file ING
Barings Research.
Mean Standard Number
Deviation Observations
1986 0.850 0.223 66
1987 0.921 0.241 72
1988 0.694 0.203 68
1989 0.838 0.156 89
1990 0.828 0.147 9 1
1 9 9 1 0.799 0.151 90
1992 0.789 0.140 9 7
1 9 9 3 0.761 0.144 97
1994 0.755 0.162 9 3
1995 0.835 0.151 101
1996 0.808 0.123 1 0 7
Average
Based on the data in table 1 we conclude there is dividend stabilisation. The
results found here are somewhat different from a earlier study, Dorsman (1988).  The
value for the stabilisation factor found here is 10% higher then the value found in the
earlier study. The period of time covered in the study of Dorsman (1988) was
1973-1983. This difference of 10% can be explained by the increasing importance of
Investor Relations (see also Dorsman, van Dijk and de Ruiter (1995)). In the context
of good Investor Relations policy stabilisation of dividend is not recommendable.
When applying stabilisation of dividend, just like with stabilisation of profit, the
stockholder is presented with an even progress of the company. But stockholders are
becoming less interested in such evenly growing figures. Stockholders want to have
reliable data representing the current situation, concerning the organisation. One way
of achieving such data is by analysis of historical figures combined with actual values,
7Stockholders are therefor  not happy with the stabilisation of figures since it would
distort this kind of analysis.
1 . A higher value of the stabilisation factor (closer to one) means a decrease in efforts
made to stabilise dividends. When this value is close to zero, it means that there is
very little fluctuation in dividends while profit could still fluctuate considerably.
This means that the development of dividend is kept at a steady pace, regardless of
profit. The other extreme is a stabilisation factor of one. Any change in profit
would have an immediately effect on dividends. This means no stabilisation.
Further more, the period spanned by the data in this article is economically very
favourable. It is a relative long period, this means that at a certain point the buffer
(which is kept to compensate for an eventually period of low profits in the future)
is full and the amount of dividends does not get distorted any more.
3. The Lintner-model
In 1956 Lintner came to the following conclusions regarding payment of dividends,
after interviewing 28 managers of companies in the United States:
1. Mutations in payments of dividend are more important than the actual amount of
the dividends.
2 . Corporations try to achieve a certain percentage of dividend payment on the long
run.
3 . Mutations in dividends are very much correlated with mutations in profit.
4 . Managers are reluctant to decrease dividends after first having increased them.
Based on these conclusions Linter developed a model, which has become known as
the Lintner-model, to explain the mutation in dividends each year. One assumption in
this model is that managers will try to pay an amount of dividends that is an optimal
percentage of the profit made. This is explains for the next equation:
Di ,*  = r.* W.I 1.t (24
8with,
Di,t* = The optimal amount of dividend for fund i year t.
ri* = The optimal amount of dividend as a percentage of the profit, for fund i.
Wi.t = The profit company i made in year t.
The value of ri* will be between 0 and 1. As companies usually wont pay more
dividends then that there was profit.
When the profit changes the actual amount of dividend paid differs from the
optimal amount that follows out of (2a). To compensate for this difference the
company will gradually adjust the dividends. This is what can be seen in the next
equation:
E[hDi.t]  = Ci  [Di,t*-Di,t] CW
with,
E[mi,t]
Di.t
Ci
= The expectation of (Di.t-  Di.t-1).
= The dividend of corporation i in year t.
= Velocity at which a company adjusts the dividend
The velocity ci  will be between 0 and 1. Higher values of Ci correspond to higher
velocity in adjusting the dividends.
Lintner also introduced a constant term. Because it is assumed that
corporations are reluctant to decrease dividends, this constant term would have to be
positive. This constant term together with equations (2a) and (2b) form the Lintner-
model:
Di.t-Di.t  = ai + pi.1  Di.t-1  + pi.2  Wi.t + Lt (3)
with,
pi.1  = -Ci.
pi.2=  Ci  ri.
pi,t= The random disturbance.
9An empirical inquiry
For every fund in appendix A there has been made an estimation of the Lintner-
model for the period 1989-1996 2.  Some of the companies that were used for the
calculations in paragraph 2 have now been disregarded because their financial year did
not terminate in December. The result of these regressions can be found in table 2.
This table includes the mean and standard deviation of the estimated coeffkients in the
regressions for the various funds, as well as the mean and standard deviation of the t-
statistics for these coeffkients. The mean and standard deviation of the various
determination coefficients (R2)  are also included in this table. The last row contains the
mean and standard deviation of the Durbin Watson statistics of the regressions made.
To give a better impression of how these values are distributed, various quantiles for
each of these values are also mentioned in this table.
’ In the empirical inquiry in the validity of the Lintner-model and the adjusted Lintner-model. the
data over the years 1987 and 1988 is omitted. This is due to missing data from I/BE/S during this
period, but also because these were two extreme years as we have shown in paragraph 2. From results
not shown here it follows that the estimated parameters in the Lintner-model aren’t influenced much
by restricting the data to the period 1989-1996.
Table 2: The mean and the stanakrd deviation qf the estimated parameters and the t-
values, the correlation coefficient, the Durbin  Watson and d@erent  quantiles
generated by the ordinary least square estimation of the Lintner-model.
Para- Mean Standard 10 30 50 - -70 % 90 %
meters Deviation
__.____.._._____.._........................................................................................................................................................................................................  - --.....
a 0.558 1.980 -0.214 0.015 0.177 0.436 1.390
t(a) 0.964 2.140 -1.990 -0.098 0.53 1 1.596 3.008
81 -0.627 0.411 -1.004 -0.871 -0.708 -0.498 -0.010
aI) -32.903 262.686 -18.566 -6.206 -3.240 -2.108 -0.557
P2 0.192 0.161 0.023 0.105 0.181 0.290 0.396
md 34.189 263.692 0.691 1.988 3.675 6.817 22.069
R2 0.742 0.262 0.344 0.667 0.839 0.927 0.993
DW 2.075 0.702 1.218 1.660 2.045 2.569 2.955
Because of the high value of R2 and de mean value of the t-statistics one can conclude
the original Lintner-model is still valid. The residuals show a constant variance and
from the Durbin Watson statistic there is no reason to reject that there is no
autocorrelation between the residuals of the same &nd.
From table 2 one can conclude that the constant term in the model is positive.
From results not shown here it follows that 76% of the companies, for which this
regression was estimated, gave a positive estimator of the constant term. This is
accordingly to the findings of Lintner in 1956, that managers are reluctant to
decreasing dividends.
Also from table 2 it can be seen that pr lies between -1 and 0, this is
accordingly to the expectations stated earlier. Again, from results not shown here, it
follows that 62.75% of the regressions made had an estimated pr that lay between -1
and 0. When a significance level of 10% is used, 80.39% of the estimated pr differ
significantly from zero. For fi2 we found a mean of 0.224 (which is between 0 and 1
like we expected). We found 80.39% of the estimated PZ to differ significantly from
zero with a significance level of 1%.
B1 1
Like it was mentioned earlier, with the estimated coefficients in the Lintner-
model one can calculate the parameters ri* and ci  in equations (2a) and (2b). The mean
optimal amount of dividend as a percentage of the profit (r*) is equal to pz/ci.  Here we
found a value for r* of 28.9%. This means that on average, the corporations included in
the inquiry want to pay an amount of cash dividends that is equal to 29% of the profit
made .
4. The  adjusted Lintner-model
The original Lintner-model can be augmented with the use of extra knowledge.
One could assume that managers are more willing to increase dividends, when the
expected profit for the next financial year is higher then the profit for the current
financial year, and vice versa. Nowadays it is possible to incorporate such knowledge
in the Lintner-model. This is simply because now there is data available which makes
this possible. Since the late eighties, the expectations of various analysts concerning
future profit, are being recorded. This gives us the opportunity to adjust the Lintner-
model with an extra variable, namely the mean of the expectations of various analysts
for the profit that is to be made the next year. This data tends to be very reliable, on
average the figures we have from I/B/E/S  deviate 9% from the actual profit made in
the next year.
The data acquired from I/EVE/S is used in the model. We have to keep in mind
that the number of analysts who contributed to these figures is not known. The
information that would be relevant to the investor is the deviation of the profit-
expectation from the current profit. We assume that management makes use of the
knowledge it has concerning the titure profits when establishing the dividends for next
year, and also that analysts (when taking the current investors relation policy into
account) can make a reliable prediction of this knowledge management has. Then the
adjusted Lintner-model would look as follows:
Di,t-Di.t  = ai + pi.1  Di,t-1  + pi,2  Wi,t +pi.j  (IBESi.t  - Wi,t)+  Cli,t (4)
1 2
with.
IBESi.t  = The I/EVE/S figure for the expectation made in year t of the profit made by
company i for year t+l
The remaining variables have the same interpretation as in equation (3).
We are interested in knowing if pi.3  is equal to zero. Thus, if the extra variable is rightly
introduced or not. This means we will try to reject the null hypothesis pi,3  = 0.
Some of the companies used for the estimation of the original Lintner-model had to be
omitted. This is because no data, concerning estimated profit was available on these
companies. The period spanned by the data used to estimate this adjusted Lintner-
model is 1989-1996. This is because the necessary data was not available for earlier
years. Table 3 shows the results from the estimation of this model.
Table 3: The average estimated coefficients, the mean, the t-values and the quantiles
of the estimated coefficients and their standurd deviation, the R2 and the Durbin
Watson of the a+sted  Lintner-model..
Parame- Mean Standard 10 30 50 - -70 % 90 %
&s deviation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0: 0.559 3.369 -0.568 -0.040 0.092 0.406 0.887
t(a) 0.628 2.012 -1.992 -0.134 0.53 1 1.596 2.927
PI -0.689 0.349 -1.078 -0.872 -0.748 -0.514 -0.214
tm) -8.645 21.916 -14.674 -6.309 -3.127 -1.820 -0.756
P2 0.255 0.254 0.05 1 0.141 0.260 0.334 0.466
a?) 6.209 15.343 0.577 1.507 2.445 4.400 9.922
I33 0.083 0.3 12 -0.193 -0.000 0.066 0.160 0.358
Us) 0.693 2.155 -1.512 -0.477 0.535 1.291 2.648
R? 0.823 0.192 0.547 0.757 0.900 0.958 0.994
D W 2.086 0.602 1.280 1.727 2.039 2.445 2.836
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From table 3 it follows that the extra variable is indeed relevant, and is justly
augmented to the original Lintner-model. When the extra variable is used there is a
clear increase in the determination coefficient from 0.742 to 0.823. The remaining
coefficients have roughly the same value as in the ‘old’ Lintner-model. In table 3 one
can see that the coefficient of the extra variable does not differ significantly from zero.
This means that we are not able to reject the null hypothesis stated earlier.
Nevertheless one should keep this variable in the model when the increase in the
determination coefficient is taken into account. Because this means that, with the extra
variable the model is able to give a better explanation of the mutation in dividends.
What is interesting to investigate now is how much do the residuals resulting from the
adjusted Lintner-model should influence any predictions concerning the future profit.
To find an answer. the next model will be estimated.
AWi.t+l = Y1.i  + Y2,i  Ui,t+  Vi,t+l
with,
AWi.t+  1 = Mutation in profit of company i from year t to year t+l
Ui,t = The residuals resulting from adjusted Lintner-model.
Vi.t*l = The random disturbance.
(5)
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Table 4: The OLS-estimates of the parameters of equation (5)
Para- Mean Standard - - - - -10 % 30 % 50 % 70 % 90 %
meters
Yl
-Wd
Y2
-U?‘z)
0.625
0.832
2.953
0.287
deviation
4.182
1.547
14.451
0.935
-0.788 -0.000 0.217 0.521 1.269
-0.66 1 -0.001 0.381 1.316 2.962
-6.702 -1.400 1.057 5.557 16.03 1
-0.854 -0.191 0.276 0.751 1.615
R’ 0.132 0.151 0.003 0.025 0.067 0.175 0.416
DW 1.954 0.708 0.985 1.646 1.954 2.425 2.920
1. From table 4 it follows that all of the coefficients do not differ significantly from
zero. Apparently the residuals from model (4) do not contain any information
concerning the future profit, accordingly to model (5). However, it remains
possible for the unexpected mutation in dividend of year t and the mutation in
profit from year t to year t+l to have a relation other then the one investigated
here. It might be possible that management only uses dividend as a signalling tool
on certain occasions. This possibility fits well within a good dividend policy in the
context of the investors relations policy. In appendix B the results from the
estimation of model (5) are mentioned, where the variable used is the residuals of
model (3) instead. The results found in table 4 still hold for this model based on the
residuals of the traditional Lintner-model.
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this article the dividend policy of Dutch companies is investigated. Miller &
Modigliani state in their traditional article that, under certain assumptions, the amount
of dividend paid is irrelevant to the stockholders. However these assumptions do not
hold in practise. We have shown that relative mutations in dividend are smaller than
relative mutations in profit in the same year. This means that dividend is not some
irrelevant figure that management looks at when all other decisions have been made,
like Miller & Modigliani suggest it. For some time now people have thought about the
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relevance of having a dividend policy. Already in the fifties it was Lintner who
developed the Lintner-model to explain the mutations in dividend. The exogenous
variables in this model are figures concerning profit and dividends. Nowadays there is a
lot more information available. The I/EVE/S  data-tile contains figures about the profit-
expectations made by analysts. In this article the traditional Lintner-model is expanded
with one exogenous variable, namely the expectation analysts have of the profit for
next year. This is because we assume that when management makes their dividend-
proposal, which in practise  is also the actual amount of dividend paid, they also take
their expectations of the future profit into account. The adjusted Lintner-model is able
to give a better explanation of the mutations in dividend than the traditional model.
Finally we tried to use the residuals of the adjusted Lintner-model to predict the future
profit. From our inquiry it could not be shown that these residuals have any use for
such predictions.
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Appendix A The companies involved in our research
Aalberts, Brocacef, AEGON, Ahold, Ahrend, AKZO Nobel, Alanheri, Amsterdam
Rubber, AOT, ATAG, Athlon, Barn, Batenburg, Beers, Begemann, Blydenstein-
Willink,  De Boer Unigro, Boskalis Westminster, Burgman  Heybroek, Koninklijke Ten
Cate, Cindu, CSM, CVG, DICO, Van Dorp Despec Groep, De Drie Electronics,
Koninklijke Econosto, Elsevier, EMIS, EVC, Fortis  Amvev, Frans Maas,  Gamma
Holding, Gelderse Papiergroep, Getronics, Geveke, Giessen-de Noord, Gist-Brocades,
Gouda Vuurvast, Unique Internationaal, Grolsch, Grontmij, GTI Holding, Hagemeyer,
HBG, Heijmans, Heineken, HES Beheer, Hoek’s Machines, Hoogovens, Hoop
Effectenbank, Hunter Douglas, IHC Caland,  Internatio Muller, Kas-Associatie, KBB,
Kempen & Co, Klene Holding, KLM, Pakhoed, Koppelpoort, Krasnapolsky, Kuhne &
Heitz, Landre & Glinderman, Macintosh, Van Melle, Van der Moolen,  Mulder
Boskoop, Multihouse, Naeff, NBM-Amstelland, Nedap, Nedlloyd, Nedschroef,
Neways, NIB, Norit, Nutricia, OCE, Van Ommeren, Ordina, OTRA,  P & C Groep,
Philips, Polynorm, Porceleyne Fles, Royal Dutch, Reesink, Rood Testhouse, Roto
Smeets de Boer, Samas,  Schuitema, Schuttersveld, Simac,  Smit Internationale, Sphinx
Gustavsberg, ASR, Stork, Telegraaf,  Textielgroep Twente, Tulip Computers,
Twentsche Kabel, Unilever, VNU, Volker, Vredestein, Wegener Arcade, Weweler,
Wolters Kluwer.
Appendix B The OLS-estimates of the parameters of equation (5) wherby the residual
variable of equation (3) has been used as explained variable.
Para- Mean Standard - - - - -10 % 30 % 50 % 70 % 90 %
meters deviation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yl 0.475 5.129 -1.020 -0.120 0.216 0.534 1.531
VYI) 0.943 1.929 -0.603 -0.009 0.400 1.327 3.016
Y2 11.226 100.324 -6.576 -1.563 1.422 4.681 12.570
T(Y~) 0.360 1.068 -0.742 -0.274 0.311 0.811 1.710
R2 0.151 0.171 0.005 0.028 0.087 0.169 0.442
DW 1.932 0.704 0.911 1.536 1.730 2.323 2.065
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